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Abstract: From the Platonistic standpoint, mathematical edifices form an immaterial,  unchanging,  and eternal world  that exists 
independently of human thought. By extension,  “scientific Platonism” says that directly  mathematizable  physical  phenomena – in 
other terms, the research field of   physics – are governed by entities belonging to this objectively existing mathematical world.
Platonism is a metaphysical theory. But since metaphysical theories, by definition, are neither provable nor refutable, anti-Platonistic 
approaches  cannot  be  less  metaphysical  than  Platonism itself.  In  other  words,  anti-Platonism is  not  “more  scientifical”  than 
Platonism. All we can do is to compare Platonism and its negations under epistemological criteria such as simplicity, economy of  
hypotheses, or consistency with regard to their respective consequences.
In  this  paper  I  intend  to  show that   anti-Platonism claiming in  a  first  approximation  (i)  that  mathematical  edifices  consist  of 
meaningless signs assembled according to arbitrary rules, and (ii) that the adequacy of mathematical entities and phenomena covered 
by physics results from  idealization of these phenomena, is based as much as Platonism on metaphysical presuppositions. Thereafter, 
without directly taking position, I try to launch a debate focusing on the following questions: 
(i) To maintain its coherence, is anti-Platonism not constrained to adopt extremely complex assumptions, difficult to defend, and not  
always consistent with current realities or practices of scientific knowledge?  
(ii) Instead of supporting anti-Platonism whatever the cost, in particular by the formulation of implausible hypotheses, would it not  
be more adequate to accept the idea of a mathematical world existing objectively and governing certain aspects of the material world,  
just as we note the existence of the material world which could also not exist?
0. Introduction
Kant asks himself how the physical laws obtained  empirically can take an mathematical form, 
knowing that  mathematics is not based on experience. In this paper I defend – while refusing any 
direct argumentation of metaphysical order – the response emanating from Platonism.
From the Platonistic standpoint, mathematical edifices form an immaterial, unchanging, and eternal 
world, that exists independently of human thought. By extension,  “scientific Platonism” says that 
directly  mathematizable  physical  phenomena – the research field of  physics – are governed by 
entities  belonging to  this  immaterial,  immutable,  eternal,  and objectively existing  mathematical 
world.
But  how  can  I  defend  such  an  essentially  metaphysical  approach  without  ever  resorting  to 
metaphysical arguments? 
The answer is simple. The direct negation of a metaphysical proposition is in turn a metaphysical 
proposition. Both propositions – the assertion and its negation –  are neither provable nor refutable. 
All we can do is to compare a metaphysical proposition and its negation under epistemological 
criteria such as simplicity, economy of hypotheses, consistency and so on.
An ineradicable prejudice alleges that hypotheses reserving the notion of objective existence to the 
only  material  world  would  be  “more  scientific”  than  other  hypotheses  claiming  the  objective 
existence of an immaterial reality. But it is not that simple. Since no one can get out of the mental  
representation he or she has of  material reality, no one is able to empirically check whether the 
material reality supposed to exist objectively coincides with the representations we have about it.  
(Maddy, 2007, p. 35) Hence Carnap relegates the ontological realism  and its competing theories 
like idealism to the same metaphysics. (Carnap, 1931, p. 237) We can certainly question ourselves 
whether abandoning the hypothesis of the existence of material reality will not lead to an infinity of 
epistemological and other inconsistencies. But nothing prevents us from taking the same question 
about the abandonment of the Platonistic hypothesis.
In this paper, I intend to show that  anti-Platonism claiming in a first approximation 
 that mathematical edifices consist of meaningless signs assembled according to arbitrary 
rules
 that the adequacy of mathematical entities and phenomena covered by physics comes out 
from the idealization of these phenomena 
is based as much as Platonism on metaphysical presuppositions.
Thereafter, I will let each one  compare Platonism and anti-Platonism in terms of epistemological 
criteria such as simplicity, economy of hypotheses, consistency and so on, without directly taking 
position.
The foundations of mathematics and physics – whatever they could be –  are not the same. At first, I 
oppose consequently the mathematical Platonism to its negations. This step will take a good half of 
the paper.
But  it  is  only  on  this basis  that  we  can  later  compare  Platonism  establishing  links  between 
mathematics and physics, to its negations supposedly “more scientific”.
 
1.  Mathematical Platonism and its negations
1.1  Beyond the Hilbert misunderstanding
An entrenched commonplace claims that “in the view of Hilbert” any mathematical edifice would 
consist  of  “meaningless  signs  assembled according to  arbitrary rules”.  Beyond  this  caricatured 
vision  (comp. Zach 2005, p.31), Hilbert's project takes an very different turn. Hilbert tackles the 
foundations of  mathematics as if  all mathematical edifices  consisted of arbitrary meaningless sign 
assemblages (Zach, 2005, p.20). For Hilbert,  reconstructing mathematics as if it were an arbitrary 
system gives  mathematics a more solid basis, particularly in regard to the proof process. (Hilbert, 
1918/1996, p.1107; Snapper,  1979, p.214) This reconstruction involves the formalization of given 
mathematical edifices by – at least in theory –  effectively arbitrary formal systems.
A formal  system  Sy stricto sensu consists  of  (i)  an alphabet  of  arbitrary signs  A,  (ii)  a  set  of 
arbitrary rules Rm governing the correct formation of “words” mi from signs belonging to A, (iii) a 
set of arbitrary rules Rd governing the correct deduction of a word mj  from another word mi, i ≠ j, 
and  (iv)  an  arbitrary  set  Ax of   axioms  Axk,  i.e.  correctly  assembled  and  irreducible  words 
undergoing  the  following  constraints:  These  Axk (i)  should  not  lead  to  inconsistencies  in  their 
consequences and (ii) must cover the entire system. A correctly written word mu  that belongs to a 
chain of correct deductions  mi → mj  going back to the axioms of Ax is a called a  theorem θv of Sy. 
Let us now consider a given mathematical edifice E, whose theorems θv  are considered true under a 
certainly less rigorous proof processus than the “mechanical” deduction of a theorem θv belonging 
to Sy. This mathematical edifice E  is formalized by the formal system Sy if and only if it is possible 
to establish a one-to-one relation, or “bijection” between each theorem θv  of Sy and each theorem 
θv of E. Let us note this bijection E  ←  Φ  →  Sy. 
What is now the nature of E ? Within Φ, an edifice E  is systematically regarded as “given”, yes, 
but given how? Is it just an other formal system Sy previously constructed – thus another  human 
made system –  where every sign σ of the alphabet A  corresponds to one and only one  sign σ  of 
the  alphabet A  whereas  Rm,  Rd and  Ax are  written with  the signs  σ of  A?  In this  case,  the 
formalization E  ←  Φ  →  Sy would be reduced to a simple formal equivalence  Sy ←  Ψ  →  Sy. 
Or, should we consider the edifice  E  irreducible to a formal system, i.e. irreducible to a human 
made system  Sy? In other words, should we consider the edifice E  an irreducible reality?
I call “ultra-formal  choice” the doctrine asserting the reducibility of  E to  Sy (or of  Φ to  Ψ) and 
“Platonistic choice” the other doctrine claiming that Φ is essentially irreducible to Ψ.
Both   choices   Platonistic   and   ultra-formal  are  metaphysical  options.  In  absolute  terms,  the 
question – The Question according to Barry Mazur (Mazur, 2008, p.2) – whether the ultra-formal 
choice or the Platonistic choice is the adequate position cannot find a definite answer. But we can 
now compare the two choices under the criteria of their epistemological consistency.
1.2  Platonism and anti-Platonism in the light of the Hilbert approach
1.21. Some pre-gödelian considerations
Let us  formalize a mathematical edifice E in terms of E  ←  Φ  →  Sy. Is this project compatible 
with  the  effective  construction  of  formal  systems  Sy being  really   arbitrary  assemblages  of 
meaningless signs ? That is not certain.
Recall that Hilbert adopts an as if strategy. Operating  as if he used  arbitrary Sy to formalize  E, 
Hilbert implements systems consisting of signs of first order logic governed by their  Rm, Rd and 
Ax to which he adds  specific signs that depend on the edifice E  to formalize. (Hilbert, 1927/1996, 
pp. 228 ff.; Snapper, 1979, pp. 213 ff.) This seems to argue in favor of Sy being not arbitrary but 
fashioned in order to comply with the requirements of  given E. To elucidate this  impression, we 
have to introduce the concepts of extension and intension.
For contemporary logic, intension is a property p that determines  all the elements belonging to a set 
S,  according  to  the  scheme  S =  {e,  e  ⇒ p}.  (Carnap,  1947,  pp.6,  10,  16)   Extension  is  the 
corresponding set  S. For the ancient logic, the extension of a concept  κi consists of the set of the 
concepts κj  to which  κi “applies” . The intension of a concept κj is the set of all concepts κi that κj 
“includes”. Let us order a set E of several concepts κu according to their increasing extension. To 
this hierarchization then corresponds  a set I of  concepts κu ordered according to their decreasing 
intension,  and vice  versa.  Our  investigation  needs  a  reformulation  of  the  ancient  hierarchizing 
conception  –   rather  vague  –   of  intension  and  extension  according  to  the  requirements  of 
contemporary logic. Let Pi be a proposition characterized by a set p(Pi) of properties. Then we can 
define the extension E(Pi) of Pi as the set of the propositions Pj characterized by a set of  properties 
p(Pj) such as p(Pi) is included in p(Pj). In formula: E(Pi) = {Pj, p(Pi) ⊆ p(Pj)}. The intension I(Pi) 
of Pi is then written symmetrically I(Pj) = {Pi, p(Pi) ⊆ p(Pj)}.
Now let us interpret the set of Pi as the set of propositions of first order logic L1°+ complemented  by 
specific signs dependent on the mathematical edifice E to formalize, and the set of the Pj  as the set 
of the propositions of E. A Pi ∈ L1°+ can be applied to a  Pj ∈ E, if and only if  Pj  belongs to the 
extension of Pi. Or, focusing on Pj ∈ E, we can also say that using Pi  to formalize Pj  presupposes 
that   Pi  belongs   to   the   intension  of    Pj.   Thus   we   have   again   the   expressions 
E(Pi) = {Pj,  p(Pi)  ⊆ p(Pj)} and  I(Pj) = {Pi,  p(Pi) ⊆  p(Pj)} which, however, are specified: all  Pi 
belong to the enriched first order logic L1°+  and all Pj, i ≠ j, to the edifice E  to be formalized.
Now rewrite the expressions {Pj, p(Pi) ⊆ p(Pj)} and {Pi, p(Pi) ⊆ p(Pj)} in the form of implication, 
which is giving in both cases p(Pj) ⇒ p(Pi).
On a purely formal level, all is said and done. The propositions Pi of the formal system Sy, far from 
being arbitrary, must comply with the  propositions Pj of E, and the choice of Hilbert to specify Sy 
by L1°+   –  first order logic enriched as required by E  –  goes exactly in the sense of this constraint. 
However, in our context, this formal result should be interpreted. We then can choose between the 
following three options:
 We affirm that the mathematical edifice  E   supporting  the propositions  Pj is  objectively  
given, and that according to the implication p(Pj) ⇒ p(Pi), the  system Sy  supporting the 
propositions Pi must effectively be configured in order to go with Pj of E. We just noticed 
that this approach is perfectly compatible with the Hilbertian proof-theoretically inspired 
as if -strategy specifying Sy by L1°+.
 Or, while accepting that the  mathematical edifice E is objectively given, we act as if E had 
been  artificially  configured  to  correspond  via the  implication  p(Pj) ⇒ p(Pi) to  the 
“arbitrary” formal system  Sy. In this case we must at least ask ourselves whatever could be 
the  point of this inverted Hilbert approach.
 Or, we strongly affirm that any mathematical edifice  E is, like the formal systems  Sy, an 
arbitrary  construction.  This  view  presupposes  –   among  other  things  –  (i)  that  the 
mathematicians from Antiquity to the 19th century, while ignoring the very notion of formal 
system,  already  conceived  and/or  manipulated  unknowingly  “arbitrary  constructions  E” 
equivalent  to  formal  systems  Sy,  and  (ii)  that  these  “arbitrary  constructions  E”  were 
predestined  –  thanks  to  a  kind  of  pre-established  harmony  anticipating  the  implication 
p(Pj) ⇒ p(Pi) ?  – to meet later the enriched first order logic L1°+ developed by Hilbert.
Let now everyone compare these three options according to the criteria of simplicity, economy of 
hypotheses, epistemological consistency and so on.
1.22  Are  Gödel's incompleteness theorems  arguments against Platonism? 
First recall the issue and the impact of  Gödel's second theorem. A valid  formalization of E by Sy 
via Φ presupposes  the  consistency and  completeness of  Sy.   Sy is  consistent if  its   axioms 
Axk ∈ Ax  do not lead to inconsistencies in their consequences, and complete if no deduction of a 
theorem  θv belonging to  Sy  would require the widening of  Ax  by other axioms Axl, l  ≠ k. The 
conditions of consistency and completeness being satisfied,  E is formalized by Sy  if and only if 
there is a bijection E  ←  Φ  →  Sy.  
Gödel's  second  theorem shows that   the consistency proof  concerning all  Sy  as  strong as  or 
stronger  than  formal  arithmetic  prevents  their  completeness  proof,  and  vice  versa.  The 
establishment of Φ between these Sy and given corresponding edifices E is not possible. Hence we 
cannot envisage a rigorous Hilbertian formalization of current mathematical edifices E.   
The Gödel disaster as such does not constitute an anti-Platonistic argument. Gödel himself is among 
the most categorical Platonists, (Gödel 1951/1995, pp. 322 ff.)  but his approach would lead us too 
far. Here I limit myself  to mention an attempt to circumvent the disaster; attempt claiming openly 
to be anti-Platonistic,  but that, in my opinion, represents in fact and despite itself an argument in  
favor of Platonism. 
Avigad and Feferman, refering to Gödel,  show that we can extract from all the edifices E affected 
by Gödel uncertainty a sub-edifice  ECm,  ECm ⊂ E,  fully mastered not by a Hilbert formalization 
E  ←  Φ  →  Sy but through a process of effective construction.  (Avigad & Feferman, 1999, pp. 6 
ff;  16  ff.  e.a;  Zach,2005,  pp.  28  ff.)  Let  us  denote  by  “MCm”  (“constructively  mastered 
mathematics”)  the  set  of  all  ECm  such  as  MCm  ⊂   M,  where  “M”  is  for  “Gödel  affected 
mathematics”. Now, MCm  ⊂ M  in turn gives p(MCm ) ⊂ p(M), thus   p(M) ⇒  p(MCm ). Unless we 
consider MCm as an isolated body in M, which Avigad and Feferman do not do, should the properties 
of   M –  whatever they may be –   not be configured so that the mastered reconstruction of  MCm 
harmonize with M?  But in this case, is M  not preceding MCm on the three  ontological, logical, and 
epistemological  levels?  (Mlika,  2007,  p.  39)  In  other  words,  is  M not  preceding  MCm in  a 
“Platonistic way”?
2.3 Is there a constructivist alternative to the ultra-formal and the Platonistic choice? 
So far, we have directly confronted the Platonistic choice to its direct negation, the ultra-formal 
choice. Alongside these opposite extremes, a third way is proposed, the so-called constructivism. 
From this standpoint, mathematical edifices are neither an objective although immaterial reality nor 
arbitrary assemblages of meaningless signs. Mathematics would be effectively constructed, without 
existing outside of their construction. However, this raises a new question: is constructivism  not 
despite itself a kind of strengthened Hilbertian as if-strategy: the (at least partial) reconstruction of 
what is already there? I return to this rather complex issue at the end of the paper in a technical  
note. (See technical note n°1) Here I merely point out that the Avigad-Feferman approach that falls 
intro constructivism (see above) pleads in favor of the reconstruction thesis. If this approach holds, 
the expressions  MCm  ⊂ M  and p(M) ⇒  p(MCm )  denote a partial but mastered  reconstruction of 
mathematics within  global, not mastered but given M. The implication  p(M) ⇒  p(MCm ) seems to 
denote  that  M precedes  MCm logically.  Everyone  is  now  invited  to  consider  whether,  on  the 
ontological level, mathematics  M which are  not mastered by humans but which allows a human 
extraction of constructive mathematics  MCm, could be human made. In a more intuitive way, we 
must ask ourselves whether, since Brouwer, constructivist mathematicians could have constructed 
presently available MCm  from nothing, instead of reconstructing at least de facto MCm from given M. 
2. Mathematics and physics: about Quine's indispensability argument
Now we begin to approach the links between mathematics and physics. These words spontaneously 
could  make  us  think  of  the  so-called  “indispensability  argument”  according  to  Quine.  The 
“argument”  in  fact  scattered  over  at  least  eight  publications  –   the  references  are  in  IEP 
(anonymous, no publication year, sect. 2) –  can be summarized  by: “given the indispensability of 
abstract mathematical beliefs within physics, physical experience justifies the belief in an objective 
existence of mathematical entities”. This position in favor of a thin-blooded Platonism is far from 
being universally shared. My own approach is different. Without arguing directly, I continue on the 
basis of Quine's position by comparing a full-blooded Platonism, certainly metaphysical, to its not 
less metaphysical negations.
2.1 The  indispensability argument in the perspective of the ultra-formal choice
Consider a proposition such as “At the time of the dinosaurs,  long before various philosophical 
schools began to compete about the foundations of mathematics, the gravity centers of three stones 
already formed a triangle with an angular sum equal to two right angles”. Fano and Graziani would 
argue that  such “somewhat  caricatural”  comments fall  “obviously” within metaphysical  beliefs. 
(Fano & Graziani, 2011, pp. 21 ff.) Perhaps it is true. But let us pass from the theorem of angular 
sum  of  the  triangle,  still  accessible  to  a  pre-mathematical/experimental  approach,  to  physical 
experimentation  stricto  sensu. The  modus  operandi of  physics  relies  on  the  epistemological  
assumption that physical laws, perhaps not “eternal”, are  reasonably timeless (see below) since a 
moment  belonging  to  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  Big  Bang.  A physical  law  outdated 
following a new paradigm still remains as a special case of a broader law. In contrast, the idea of 
physical laws changing anytime would not be operating in physics. Far from being a metaphysical  
belief,  the  epistemological  presupposition of  reasonable timelessness of  physical  laws  is  until 
further notice empirically confirmed. Since  astrophysical observation goes back in time, intrinsic 
variations in physical laws would be empirically detected. Consider now a physical phenomenon X, 
and its mathematical expression – denoted ) by P(x) – belonging to E. Let us accept the reasonably 
timeless  aspect  of  P(x)  as  certified  by  astrophysical  observation.  Will  there  be  an  objective 
difference between P(x)  ∈ E and the theorem of the angular sum of triangles we suppose already 
interpreted at the time of the dinosaurs by three non-aligned stones?
In this regard, we are faced with the following  choices:
 
 Either we consider the edifice  E,  P(x)  ∈ E, as (i) objectively given, and (ii) as timelessly 
confirmed by physical  phenomena  X accessible  to  astrophysical  observation,  without  of 
course excluding the Hilbert strategy treating E as if it were a human made assemblage  of 
arbitrary signs.
 Or we reject the possibility of an objectively given edifice  E by qualifying this idea  as 
metaphysical. But in this case we must also state that (i) the epistemological presupposition 
of  reasonably timeless physical laws without which the  modus operandi of physics would 
become inoperative,  and  (ii)  the  mathematized  laws  P(x)  ∈ E timelessly  confirmed  by 
astrophysical observation, are in turn metaphysically undermined.
Everyone is free to judge.
At present, research on possible variations of universal constants is ongoing. (See Uzan, 2002) The 
definitive  detection  of  such  variations  –  necessarily  very  small  and  until  further  order 
hypothetical  – could lead to the development of new paradigms in physics.
When  appropriated,  let  each  one  determine  the  epistemological  value of  these  new paradigms 
according to whether we refer them 
 to objectively existing mathematics,
 or to human made arbitrarily constructed mathematics.
2.2  The  indispensability argument in the perspective of constructivism 
If  we  assert  that  mathematical  edifices  E are  constructed  by  humans,  we  should  assume 
consequently that  the  physical  phenomena  X expressed  by  P(x)  ∈ E are  in  turn “constructed” 
following the characteristics of E. On the other hand, it seems  reasonable to assume that all humans 
perceive in the same way all physical phenomena mathematizable by P(x) ∈ E. This requires that 
all humans construct physical reality in the same way. To remain coherent, such a vision needs a  
multitude of metaphysical presuppositions oscillating between the approaches of Kant and Hegel.
3. About the epistemological status of mathematical tools in physics
3.1 What is idealization ?
A mathematized physical law represents an idealization  of empirical data.  Nobody will deny it. In 
contrast,  when  the  idealization  status   characterizing  the  laws  of  physics  is  considered  as  an 
argument against the Platonistic conception of a physical world governed by pure mathematics, we 
encounter great difficulties. Specifically, both arguments “It is because of their idealized aspect that 
the  physical  phenomena  are  aligned  with  mathematics”  and  “Mathematics   arises  from  the 
idealization  of  physical  phenomena” are  not  only problematic  but  still  fall  within  an  identical  
problem.
To be sure to  talk about  the same thing,  let  us try to  clarify what  we mean by “idealization”. 
Consider a physical phenomenon X consisting of sub-phenomena Xi. Any manifestation of Xi is in 
relation with other  Xj.  Note  Xi =  Ri(...,  Xj , …), i, j = 1, ... n. Suppose that  X is expressed by a 
mathematical entity P(x) ∈ E taking the form Pi(xi) = φ(..., xj , …), i,j = 1, ... n, where xi, xj are – in 
order to simplify –  numerical values in the  broadest sense:  scalars, vectors, tensors, functions of a  
Banach and so on. Each  φi(...,  xj , ...)  corresponds to a  Xi =  Ri(...,  Xj , …). Now we  measure 
empirically the phenomenon  X.  In  most  cases,  we will  find for each  Xi,  Xj  a  higher  or lower 
deviation Δxi, Δxj from the ideal values xi, xj.. Let   xi, xj be the respective neighborhoods of   xi, xj, 
such as the  empirical values  (xi  + Δxi), (xj+ Δxj) belong to  xi,  xj. The expression  P(x)  ∈ E  is an 
idealization of  X if  for  a  large  number  of  empirical  measurements  of  X,  the  empirical  values 
(xi  + Δxi), (xj+ Δxj)  tend to the limits  xi,  xj. Note that here we can not specifically take account of 
quantum physics, but this does not lead to specific difficulties: (i) The links between  mathematized 
idealization P(x) ∈ E  and empirical data affected by deviations (xi + Δxi), (xj+ Δxj), and (ii) the fact 
that empirical quantum data conflict with the patterns of the macroscopic world, are the subject of 
complementary but different issues which can be treated separately. 
3.2 On what is idealization based? 
Let us abbreviate the expressions (xi + Δxi), (xj+ Δxj) by xi E ∈ xi,  xj E ∈ xj  where the index E is for 
“empirical”  and ask the crucial  question:  How can we explain the fact  that  a large number of 
measures xi  E ∈ xi,  xj  E ∈ xj  tend systematically towards the limits xi, xj? The mention of a “large 
number” of measures could make us spontaneously think of the law of large numbers, in a  first  
approximation the fact that the relative frequency of an often enough repeated event tends to a limit  
equal to its probability. (A more rigorous definition is given in the technical end note n°2.) The law 
of large numbers undoubtedly plays a role in the tendency of  xi  E ∈ xi,  xj  E ∈ xj to approach the 
limits xi, xj, but does not explain all.  First of all, the law of large numbers is not self-evident. This 
rather complex issue is shortly treated in the technical end note n°2. On the other hand, the law of 
large numbers is interpreted by very different physical phenomena: playing heads or tails, roulette, 
road accidents etc. etc. So we have to see the law of large numbers not as a physical law but as a 
kind of  immaterial logic being “behind” the material phenomena which express it.  Now we are 
certainly free to consider this kind of logic (i) as an idealization, i.e. an  outcome of a large number 
of  empirical  trials,  or  else  (ii)  as  an  objectively  given framework  despite  its  immateriality. 
Nevertheless, the choice favoring position (i)  confronts us with a thorny question: How can a large 
number of random phenomena obey the law of large numbers,  without a law of large numbers 
pushing them in this sense?  
Regarding the reduction of the law of large numbers to an empirical idealization, we thus face the 
following dichotomy: 
 Either we just note that the law of large numbers governing phenomena different from each 
other exists objectively as an immaterial law, immaterial precisely because of the diversity 
of  phenomena that this law governs. 
 Or we consider the law of large numbers as an idealization. But in this case we must assume 
the circularity featured above: how can a large number of random phenomena  tend to limits 
determined by the law of large numbers without a law of large numbers  pushing them in 
this sense?
In other words, the rejection of Platonism is paid by circularity which, in physics, is execrated as 
much as metaphysics.
But anyway, the law of large numbers plays here only a partial role.  The deviations  Δxi,  Δxj  of 
effective measures from the ideal values  xi, xj can perhaps be considered as random phenomena. 
However, the mere fact that the relative frequencies of random events  Ei,  Ej  subjected to a large 
number of trials tend toward limits equal to the probabilities p(Ei), p(Ei)  does not explain why the xi 
E ∈ xi,  xj  E ∈ xj  tend to  specific limits  xi,  xj,  so that the corresponding physical phenomenon X 
takes exactly the expression  Pi(xi) = φi(..., xj , …), i, j = 1, ... n. For  a mathematized physical law 
P(x) ∈ E to be significant, there  necessarily must be a set C of constraints – as immaterial  as the 
law of large numbers –  which act in such a way that the empirical measures  xi  E ∈ xi,  xj  E ∈ xj 
sufficiently  often  repeated  tend  towards  the  limits  xi,  xj.  Such  a  formulation  is  doubtlessly  a 
metaphysical proposition, and the physicist rightly confines himself/herself to taking note of the 
correspondence between P(x) ∈ E  and sufficiently often repeated empirical measures xi E ∈ xi,  xj E 
∈ xj,  without paying attention to  C ensuring  P(x)  ∈ E  through experimental deviations  Δxi,  Δxj. 
But,  by  contrast,  a  debate revolving  around  the  following  theses:  (i)  physical  phenomena  are 
mathematizable because of their idealization and (ii) mathematics emerges from the idealization of 
empirical observations, or –  as it is suggested by Penelope Maddy – applied mathematics precedes 
pure  mathematics  (Maddy,  2008,  esp.  pp.  20  ff.;  pp.33  ff.),  such a  debate  cannot  legitimately 
neglect the issue of C. 
Let us turn first to the thesis (i):
 If we want a mathematizable physical law expressed by P(x) ∈ E to correspond to the  limits 
xi, xj of sufficiently often repeated effective  empirical measures xi E ∈ xi,  xj E ∈ xj, we have 
the  possibility  to postulate  the existence of a set C of  constraints guaranteeing  that  the 
xi E ∈ xi,  xj E ∈ xj repeated sufficiently often tend towards the limits xi, xj. In this case C must 
reflect the mathematical edifice E to which P(x) belongs. In other words E  must precede the 
empirical measures   xi E ∈ xi,  xj E ∈ xj  on the  ontological, logical and epistemological plan. 
 Or we refuse to postulate the existence of C. But how then idealize empirical measures in 
terms of   P(x) ∈ E  without postulating any intrinsic link between  xi  E ∈ xi,  xj  E ∈ xj and 
P(x)  ∈ E? In other words, how  idealize empirical measures in terms of   P(x)  ∈ E while 
accepting that the xi E ∈ xi,  xj E ∈ xj can take any values? 
Let us now admit with P. Maddy the thesis (ii).
 If  we  do  not  want  to  assume  absurdly  that  mathematical  edifices  E  results  from the 
idealization of empirical phenomena evolving anyhow, we should accept the existence of C 
ensuring that sufficiently often repeated empirical measures xi E ∈ xi,  xj E ∈ xj  tend towards 
the limits xi, xj.  In this case, the set C of immaterial constraints must correspond exactly to 
the mathematical edifice E containing P(x). 
 If we deny the existence of the set of immaterial constraints C corresponding to E, we fall 
back  into  the  difficult  assumption  that  mathematical  edifices  E are  resulting  from  the 
idealization of empirical phenomena evolving anyhow. 
A more  rigorous  elucidation  of  the  epistemological  status  of  idealization  intervening  in  the 
formulation of physical laws must reflect the very thorny issue of irreversibility. The technical note 
n° 3 at the end of this paper brings some additional developments going in this direction.
This being said, we must recognize that all (!) standpoints concerning the role of idealization in the 
mathematization  of  physical  laws  include  a  lot  of  metaphysics.  Everyone  is  now  invited  to 
determine the standpoint that seems more plausible to him or  her and especially more consistent 
and more economical in initial and subsidiary hypotheses. In other words, everyone is now invited 
to choose between the following two conceptions:
 Either we accept the objective existence of an immaterial mathematical universe and the 
assumption that some entities of this mathematical universe govern some of the phenomena 
of material reality,  just as we note the objective existence of material reality, knowing that  
this latter could also not exist. From this perspective, the idealization of the physical laws 
would  consist  in  our  experimental  efforts  to  approach  optimally  these  immaterial, 
immutable, and timeless laws, that the material aspect of physical phenomena and of all 
experimentation tend to distort. 
 Or we consider  this conception too metaphysical and replace it by another metaphysics. We 
decree that mathematics is human made. But in this case we must also adopt a whole range 
of hypotheses supposed to address the following questions: 
(i)  How  do  physical  phenomena,  that  may  well  not  comply  with  our  human  made 
mathematics, nevertheless comply with it, at least to a certain extent?  
(ii) How do experimental results, despite their dispersion that precisely requires operations 
of idealization concerning the formulation of physical laws, nevertheless converge towards 
immutable limits supposed to belong to human made mathematical edifices?
***
More technical end notes
1. About mathematical constructivism as an alternative to Platonism
Any discussion about  mathematical constructivism requires lengthy developments. The following lines are just 
trying to raise some difficulties about constructivism that cannot simply be swept aside.
As everyone knows, from the standpoint of constructivism, only the set of natural numbers N is given. Any other 
mathematical  edifice  E would  be  effectively constructed  by humans on  the  bases  of  N.  On the  other  hand, 
Troelstra and van Dalen say that “(...) mathematics does not consist in the formal manipulation of symbols (...)” 
(Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, p. 4). For Brouwer, the approach to be followed presupposes “(...)completely  
separating mathematics from mathematical language. (...)” (Brouwer in Iemhoff, 2014, sect. 2.1). However, if we 
admit that  a mathematical language L, far from being reducible to an assemblage of meaningless signs, performs 
the function of a significant denoting as signified an edifice E, should this latter not be there at least potentially? 
Would  the  “effective  construction”  of  E  not  be  in  fact  a  reconstruction,  i.e.  an  as  if  strategy to  what  the 
constructivism just imposes a set of rules and constraints different of the Hilbert approach? Certainly, the “logical 
foundations”  of  classical  mathematics  are  transformed  –   notably  by  the  “Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-
interpretation”  –  intro construction rules such as “ : to prove∨  P ∨ Q we must either have a proof of P or have a 
proof  of Q”; “  :  to  prove∧  P ∧ Q we  must  have  both  a  proof  of P and  a  proof  of Q”,  etc.  These  rules  are 
necessarily incompatible with the  tertium non datur; thereby, from the constructivist view, several theorems of 
classical mathematics cannot be validated. But how to avoid that these rules govern the construction of anything 
from anything? In this regard the constructivism introduces  axioms,  an approach which, from my standpoint, 
pleads for the  reconstruction thesis. Moreover,  some constructivist  axioms are  supposed to  ensure continuity 
between achieved constructions of  edifices E  and what remains to be  constructed in the future. For this purpose 
Kreisel introduced the so-called  CS or  IM axiomatic (for “creating subject” or “idealized mathematician”); the 
mathematics community in flesh and blood  whose members reciprocally correct their mistakes,  knowing that 
over time the younger generations succeed the more ancient,  is  idealized by an immortal mathematician, free 
from error, but not omniscient; he or she or it must proceed in stages. These CS axioms are (CS1)  □nA    ¬□nA, 
(CS2)    □mA → □m+nA,  (CS3)  ∃n □nA ↔ A.  (CS1) can be neglected here. The interpretation of  (CS2) is 
“That what the  CS assert as true at the moment n, he or she or it maintains it as true at all moments  m  + n, 
n ≥ 0.” In other words, the  CS accumulates his/her/its truths  over time.  But  for such a accumulation to remain 
consistent over time, the discoveries made at the moment m should harmonize with each future discoveries made  
at  any moment  m +  n.  Under  these  conditions,  does  what  is  effectively constructed  at  the  moment  m,  not 
presuppose the potential presence already at the moment m of all what will be constructed at any future moment 
m +n ? The other axiom (CS3) denotes “ What is true will be discovered by the CS  at a moment n as being true.” 
(Comp. Iemmhoff, 2014, 2.2) But can we expect to discover in the future something that is not potentially given?  
Anyway, if  we classify Platonism rightly into metaphysics while considering constructivism as a negation of  
Platonism, then constructivism is neither more, nor lees metaphysical than that it denies. Let everyone decide  
which of these two metaphysics is more consistent.  
2. The law of large numbers and its epistemological status  
Kolmogorov, after having admitted “for long time” that (i) “the frequency approach based on the idea of a limiting 
frequency as the number of trials tends to infinity does not give a foundation for the applicability of the results of  
probability theory to practical questions, where we deal with a finite number of trials; [and that] (ii) the frequency 
approach in the case of a large but finite number of trials cannot be developed in a rigorous purely mathematical 
way”,  adopted  later  a  more  nuanced  view of  the  point  (ii),  while  maintaining  his  position  on the  point  (i).  
(Kolmogoroff, 1963, pp.176 f.) To take account of the fact  that we always deal with a finite number of trials, we 
have to formulate the law of large numbers in terms of meta-probabilities. Indeed, for a finite number N of trials,  
the difference between the relative frequency n(ei)/N of an event ei and its probability p(ei) cannot be predicted 
with absolute certainty. All we can do is to determine the meta-probability p that this difference, after N trials, is 
less than or equal to ε, where ε is an arbitrarily small real number. If and only if there is a factual probability law 
p(e) over the set  e of events ei which allows to know effectively p(ei), we can express this meta-probability by 
p[n(ei)/N – p(ei) ≤ ε ]. On this basis and introducing a second arbitrarily small real number δ, the law of large 
numbers takes the form ∀i, ∀(ε, δ), ∃ N0, ∀N ≥  N0, p[n(ei)/N – p(ei) ≤ ε ]  ≥  (1 – δ). (Mugur, 2006, pp. 224 
f.). Now the simple reading of the law of large numbers denotes that the latter, instead of “founding” the factual  
probabilities p(ei), presupposes their given existence in order to acquire significance.
3. Idealized  physical laws and irreversibility 
Formulating  idealized  physical  laws  means  –   among  other  things  –   to  ignore  all  the  factors  generating  
irreversibility, such as friction, energy perdition, experimental perturbations and so on. So far, there is no problem.  
It is however questionable to use the idealized aspect of physical laws as an anti-Platonistic argument.
Intuition and common sense suggest that irreversibility is the  direct negation of reversibility. Note however the  
following detail: For any factor A to be a direct negation of the  factor B, both factors A and B should refer to the  
same type  of  system.  Certainly,  the   common sense  still  seems to  indicate  that   irreversibility  satisfies  this 
condition: A gas constituting an isolated system Σ characterized by its entropy variation ΔS ≥  0  appears to 
remain the “same” system Σ between its initial state ΣI corresponding to a low entropy S and its final state ΣF  with 
entropy maximum.  And  if the entropy of the system Σ returned later to its initial minimum value – which of 
course never happens –   should we not still mention the “same” system just evolving differently?
In fact, contrary to the false evidences of “common sense”, the initial  ΣI state and the final state  ΣF of a  same 
irreversible process does not engage a system remaining the “same” throughout the process.
Consider an ideal watch without internal frictions etc. whose needles turn by their own inertia at a constant speed. 
This system, as long as nothing disturbs it, is reversible in terms of the spatial configuration  of its needles; it will  
return to any configuration it occupies at a given moment. Under these conditions, the system (i) is characterized  
by an entropy variation ΔS = 0 and (ii) “remains the same” because it conserves its functioning mode. Now let us 
create an irreversible situation by projecting the system violently to the ground. This time the entropy variation  
gives  ΔS  > 0,  while  the  system – reduced  to  fragments  –  does  not conserve  its  functioning  mode.  Nobody 
would  seriously  say  that  the  fragments  scattered  on  the  ground  are  the  “same”  system  as  the  ideal  
watch   in  operating  condition.  In  a  more  general  way,  the  ideal  reversibility  of  a  physical  system 
ΣIR ≡ Pi(xi) = φ(..., xj , …), i,j = 1, ... n, presupposes the conservation of the  functioning mode fm(ΣIR) while its 
real irreversibility is simply the non-conservation of fm(ΣIR). The deviations (xi + Δxi) (xi + Δxj) the real system Σ 
expresses relatively to the ideal ΣIR system are due to entropy generating factors such as friction, energy perdition,  
experimental perturbations etc. The irreversibility of these phenomena overlays the ideal reversibility of ΣIR. The 
ideal conservation of fm(ΣIR) can be formalized in a very general way by the Klein four-group V = ({I, e, f, g}, ⊥). 
The four elements I, e, f, g are transformations.  ⊥ symbolizes the transformation  of any a  ∈  {I, e, f, g} into 
b ∈ {I, e, f, g}. “I” designates the identity transformation such as  ∀ a ∈ {I, e, f, g}, I ⊥ a = a ⊥ I = a. For e, f, g, 
we set ∀ a ∈ {I, e, f, g}, a ⊥ a = I   and  e ⊥ f = f ⊥ e = g, f ⊥ g = g ⊥ f = e,  g ⊥ e = e ⊥ g = f. It  is  easy  to 
show that   I  ⊥ e  ⊥ g  ⊥ f  =  I.  In  fact,  I  ⊥ e  = e,  so (I  ⊥ e )  ⊥ f   = e  ⊥ f  = g.  Since I  ⊥ e  ⊥ f   = g, 
(I ⊥ e  ⊥ f ) ⊥ g = g ⊥ g = I.
The sentence I ⊥ e ⊥ g ⊥ f = I formalizes any system remaining identical through all its transformations. Hence 
the  reversibility  of  an  ideal  system  ΣIR can  be  written  fm(ΣIR)  ⇒ V.  Any form of  irreversibility  in  contrast 
expresses the transition  V → non-V. The functioning mode  fm(ΣIR) of the system ΣIR  is obviously an intrinsic 
property  of  ΣIR,  whereas  the  transition  V →  non-V occurs  independently of  the  intrinsic  properties  of  the 
concerned system ΣIR. Consider several systems with very different properties: a watch, a car engine, our Earth  
with its moon revolving around it etc. Let us smash this watch against a wall, forget to put oil in the car engine,  
imagine that a mega-meteorite pulverizes our Earth. The result implies in all cases the transition  V → non-V. 
However, this transition V → non-V is not sufficient for determining the three respective fm(ΣIR) of the watch, the 
car engine and the Keplerian Earth-moon system. The entropy production due to the deviation (xi + Δxi) (xi + Δxj) 
that a real system Σ marks relative to the corresponding ideal system ΣIR is only a special case of the transition 
V → non-V affecting any system independently from its intrinsic properties. In these conditions, does the thought 
pattern of a physical phenomenon Σ ideally governed by P(x) ∈ E but de facto altered by an irreversibility being 
superposed on P(x) ∈ E, does this thought pattern not imply that the ideal law P(x) ∈ E exists independently from 
the irreversibility factors affecting it?
 If we postulate that  P(x)  ∈ E  results from the idealization of irreversible phenomena, we must deny 
irreversibility because in  a material  world where irreversibility expressing the transition  V  → non-V 
makes all  ideal entities tend to degradation, the emergence of an ideal law  P(x)  ∈ E from degraded 
phenomena would go against irreversibility. 
 If we refuse to deny irreversibility denoted by experience, we must accept that the ideal law P(x) ∈ E is 
initially given.
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